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This chapter examines the emergence of neoliberalism in development economics and 
development studies, and the implications of the neoliberal transition across both scholarship and 
policy-making. It argues that the meaning and significance of neoliberal theory and its policy 
implications have shifted over time, place and issue, and that there can be inconsistencies across 
its component parts. These are, often, due to tensions between the rhetorical and policy worlds 
built by the advocates of neoliberalism and the realities of social and economic reproduction in 
the so-called “developing” countries. Examination of these tensions can help to illuminate the 
weaknesses of the Washington consensus, the reasons for its displacement by the 
post-Washington consensus led by Joseph Stiglitz, and the ensuing disputes between the 
post-Washington consensus and its predecessor around the shortcomings of “deregulation”, and 
the desirability and optimal extent of state intervention in the economy. The chapter concludes 
that the differences between the Washington consensus and the post- Washington consensus 
have been overblown and, in particular, that they share much the same conception of 
development and attachment to neoliberalism, and the same limited commitment to democracy. 
However, because of its greater plasticity the post-Washington consensus is better positioned to 
weather the criticisms levelled against the Washington consensus, especially after the impact of 
the economic crisis starting in 2007. 
 
Neoliberalism and Its Critics 
Over the last few years, doubts have been expressed over whether neoliberalism is a concept that 
can be deployed either validly or even usefully across the social sciences (see, for example, 
Castree, 2006, and Ferguson, 2007). This may reflect the continuing throes of discursive critique 
of concepts in general and would apply equally to other commonly used terms, most notably, 
globalisation. But, for neoliberalism in particular, there are genuine doubts sewn about its 
diversity in both policy and impact and, consequently, over its capacity either to define a 
distinctive ideology or set of policies, or to specify the nature of contemporary capitalism. 
These conundrums are no less pronounced in the case of neoliberalism and development. For the 
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sake of convenience, and as is common across both scholarship and popular discourse, 
neoliberalism in this context is heavily associated with the Washington consensus (WC) and the 
practices of the World Bank, the IMF and other international organisations, including the WTO, 
the European Commission and the European Central Bank. But, in the last years of the 
millennium, the WC gave birth, if not way, to the so-called post-Washington consensus (PWC; 
see Fine et al, 2001). The PWC has emphasised that markets (and institutions) work imperfectly 
and so provides the rationale for state intervention. For some, this shift from WC to PWC 
represents a distinct break between the two, at least to the extent that the PWC is implemented in 
practice. This is certainly how proponents of the PWC see matters (for example, Stiglitz, 1998), 
as they associate neoliberalism narrowly with the WC and the dogmatic belief in the virtues of 
the free market by way of their own critical point of departure. For others, though, the PWC is 
essentially the WC (and the continuation of neoliberalism itself) by other means. Adding to the 
confusion is the stance of John Williamson, who first coined the phrase, WC, in the late 1980s. 
He both disassociates it from neoliberalism as such and considers that differences between the 
WC and PWC are minor and exaggerated for polemical purposes by proponents of the PWC 
relative to core principles that it shares in common with the WC around the virtues of ‘sound’ 
macroeconomic policy (that is, restrictive fiscal and monetary policy, ‘flexible’ labour markets, 
‘free’ trade and capital flows, privatisations, the absence of government intervention on prices, 
and so on), and maximal, though not exclusive, reliance upon (global) market forces (see below, 
and Marangos, 2007, 2008, and Williamson, 2007). 
This chapter argues that neoliberalism is a valid and useful concept, both in general and in the 
context of development, but it has to be reconstructed carefully across three dimensions (see 
Fine, 2009a). The first is conceptual. Neoliberal thought incorporates a complex construct of 
rhetorical (ideological), intellectual (scholarly) and policy elements. There is a shifting 
combination of these across time, place and issue, and the notion of neoliberalism is not always 
deployed consistently in distinct contexts or over time. There is also a tension across these 
elements and the material reality that they purport to represent and project: a virtual world made 
up of more or less thwarted market forces, and one which should be remade as far as possible to 
conform to the image conjured by neoclassical economic theory (Carrier and Miller, 1998). 
There can be inconsistencies within each of these elements. The scholarly justification for the 
virtues of the market has been supported both by the neo-Austrianism closely associated with 
Friedrich von Hayek and the general equilibrium theory of mainstream economics, which is 
based on neoclassical orthodoxy and is absolutely intolerant of alternatives (see Denis, 2004, 
2006, and Mirowski, 2007). But these are at odds with one another, with the former emphasising 
the inventive and transformative subjectivity of the individual and the spontaneous emergence of 
an increasingly efficient order through market processes, whereas the other is preoccupied with 
the efficiency properties of a static equilibrium achieved entirely in the logical domain, on the 
basis of unchanging individuals, resources and technologies. Despite their claims to the contrary, 
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neither captures the political economy and moral philosophy that underpins the invisible hand 
associated with Adam Smith (see Milonakis and Fine, 2009). 
Moreover, in the rhetorical and policy worlds, even the most ardent supporter of freedom of the 
individual in general, and through the market in particular, concedes that those freedoms can 
only be guaranteed through state provision of, and coercion for, a core set of functions and 
institutions, ranging over fiscal and monetary policy to law and order and property rights, 
through to military intervention to secure the “market economy” when this becomes necessary. 
In practice, then, neoliberalism is often heavily associated with authoritarianism, while its 
attachment to classical liberalism and political democracy is hedged and heavily conditional in 
practice (see below, and Chile serves as a classic illustration in view of its dependence after the 
overthrow of Allende on the monetarist Chicago boys – as it were, we have ways of making 
markets to be free!; see, for example Barber, 1995, Bresnahan, 2003, and Saad-Filho, 2007). The 
foregoing begins to explain why the term neoliberalism should prove especially elusive across 
rhetoric, scholarship, policy and realism. As such, it is possibly no harder to pin down than such 
concepts as globalisation or social capital but, as for these as well as other examples pervasive 
across the social sciences, this requires that it be critically reconstructed and assessed. 
In this respect, the second key dimension for the reconstruction of neoliberalism concerns what 
is distinctive about it over and above its rhetorical emphasis on the freedom of both market and 
individuals. This is to be found in the distinguishing characteristic of capitalism over the last 
forty years or so, which has set it apart from what has gone before, and increasingly so over time. 
This is the role of finance in general and of financialisation in particular (Fine, 2008). These 
processes include not only the extraordinary proliferation and expansion of financial markets and 
instruments as such, both within and between countries, but also the penetration of financial 
processes and imperatives into ever more aspects of economic and social reproduction. The 
result has been, both directly and indirectly, precisely the economic phenomena that are 
commonly associated with neoliberalism, and which go far beyond the traditional contrast, 
within macroeconomics, between monetarism and Keynesianism, or between the new orthodoxy 
in development economics of relying upon the market as opposed to the old developmentalism 
based upon modernisation, welfarism and industrialisation. Typically, there has been 
deregulation of the financial sector itself, accompanied by commercialisation, commodification, 
privatisation, imposition of user charges, liberalisation of the capital account of the balance of 
payments, and so on. These were component parts of state strategies to transfer capacity to 
allocate resources intertemporally (the balance between investment and consumption), 
intersectorally (the composition of output and employment) and internationally towards an 
increasingly globally integrated financial sector. This is not simply to reduce such systemic 
developments to the power or imperatives of finance, but to recognise how the promotion of 
markets in general has underpinned the promotion of financial markets in particular as a key 
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feature of neoliberalism. 
Third, apart from reconstructing neoliberalism across its multiple dimensions and highlighting its 
inextricable connections with financialisation, there is a significant distinction between two 
phases of neoliberalism. The earlier might be dubbed the transition or shock phase. In the wake 
of Reaganism/Thatcherism, states intervened heavily and forcefully to promote the globalised 
expansion of capital in general and of finance in particular, through contractionary fiscal and 
monetary policies, privatisation, deregulation, social security cutbacks, the introduction of stiffer 
rules constraining social protests, and so on. These policies have represented a severe assault on 
the poor and progressive values, but they also represented a redefinition rather than a withdrawal 
of the state in which, either by accident or design, the weight and influence of finance in national 
and international economies have grown by leaps and bounds (see Gowan, 1999, Panitch and 
Konings, 2009, and Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005). 
By contrast, the later phase of neoliberalism, leading to the financial crisis starting in 2007, was 
more muted and comprised two aspects. On the one hand, it accommodated the reactions against 
the extreme inequity and iniquity of outcomes across economic and social provision which were 
enforced in the transition phase. On the other hand, and of greater weight, is the use of the state 
to sustain the newly established framework for capital accumulation, especially the prominence 
of finance, with its most regressive consequences being targeted for regulation or amelioration at 
the margin. This arrangement was stress-tested most dramatically in the recent financial crisis, 
when developed countries rapidly committed unprecedented resources to sustaining their 
collapsing financial systems. Such heavy state intervention was unmistakably neoliberal in 
substance, not least being introduced by erstwhile President Bush and Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown in order to shore up failing banks and insurance companies, including the formal 
nationalisation of key institutions and the absorption of failing banks by their healthier 
competitors. Despite these occasionally audacious initiatives, no significant structural change has 
taken place in Western financial systems in the aftermath of the crisis. 
Neoliberalism and Development 
Against this background, our focus can shift to neoliberalism and development more generally. 
Attention to this can be placed upon the shift between the WC and the PWC. But, before doing 
so, reference should be made to what might be termed the pre-WC. This is most closely 
associated with Robert McNamara’s Presidency at the World Bank (1968-81). At the level of 
rhetoric, this period is attached to anti-communism in a context where the Soviet model offered 
an alternative to the “developing” countries in the wake of widespread decolonisation and 
intense left activity in most countries, including armed mass movements in three continents. The 
notion of development within this orthodoxy was linked to modernisation, and underpinned by 
Keynesianism and a rudimentary version of welfarism. Methodologically, development 
economics was both highly inductive and historical in content, grasping the idea that 
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development involved a transition through modernisation to the ideal-type of advanced 
capitalism, most notably represented by the five stages of economic growth popularised by 
Rostow (1960) in his appropriately entitled The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto. 
By the same token, policy was perceived to involve significant state intervention and the 
provision of social and economic infrastructure for industrialisation, including public ownership 
of key industries if necessary. These developmental policies and perspectives were posited 
without reference to the Cold War, the brazen allocation of aid and development finance 
according to Western policy imperatives and commercial interests, the systemically biased 
workings of the global economy and the constraints that this imposed on the development 
strategies of the poor countries. Of course, the pre-WC was also heavily contested. Indicative 
was the strength of radical alternatives in scholarship, against an orthodoxy that now seems 
disconcertingly progressive by comparison to that of today. This confrontation was especially 
prominent in the various forms of dependency theory, which promoted the view that 
development and underdevelopment constitute two sides of the same coin (see Cardoso and 
Faletto, 1979, Kay, 1989, ch.5, Palma, 1981 and Saad-Filho, 2005). 
The WC emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a dramatic right-wing reaction against the 
perceived weaknesses of the pre-WC developmentalist consensus. Rhetorically, the WC involved 
a heavy attachment to a universalist neoliberal ideology, with absolute commitment to the free 
market and the presumption of the state as a source of both inefficiency and corruption, not least 
through rent-seeking. At the level of scholarship, the WC suppressed the old development 
economics as a separate and respected field within the discipline, even denying the scope for its 
existence, and imposed, instead, a rigid adherence to the deductive and formal methods of 
mainstream, neoclassical economics which, supposedly, only needed to be applied to specific 
fields, among them economic development. This process provides a striking example of 
“economics imperialism” in the form of the so-called new development economics in which not 
only the economy itself but also social aspects of development shouldbe seen as reducible to the 
principles of the dismal science of pursuit of self-interest (see Fine and Milonakis, 2009, Jomo 
and Fine, 2006, and Fine 2009b). 
While the WC claimed to be leaving as much as possible to the market, the previous section has 
shown that this is better seen as rebuilding the state to intervene on a discretionary basis 
systematically to promote the expansion of a globalising and heavily financialised capitalism. In 
effect, the WC comprised three elements: the hegemony of mainstream economics within 
development theory; the predominance of the World Bank in setting the agenda for the study of 
development, with the Bank and the IMF imposing the standards of orthodoxy within 
development economics itself; and the redefinition of development from systemic transformation 
to a set of policies to achieve development, with limited specification of what this would be. 
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Strikingly, the WC discarded the previous consensus around (domestically financed) capital 
accumulation as the key to development and, instead, focused almost exclusively on the need for 
“appropriate” incentives and the “correct” economic policies, especially fiscal restraint, 
privatisation, the abolition of subsidies and government intervention on the prices of goods and 
services, flexibilisation of the labour market, trade liberalisation, export-led growth and an open 
capital account of the balance of payments. 
Not surprisingly, the WC did not go unchallenged both from within economics and from 
development studies. But each of these has also experienced a sharp decline in political economy 
approaches since the early 1980s, under the sustained assault of mainstream economics and 
right-wing ideology and politics that had become wedded to neoliberalism and wholly intolerant 
of alternatives. Despite these profound difficulties, by the late 1980s there was considerable 
momentum behind the critique of the WC both within academia and in the emerging social 
movements, with two complementary approaches to the fore. 
The first of these was inspired by the notion of the developmental state (see Fine, 2006, for an 
overview). With particular emphasis upon industrial policy, the notion of a developmental state 
was perceived to apply to the successful industrialisations in the East Asian newly industrialising 
countries (NICs), with Japan as the classic precursor, followed by the four ‘tigers’ (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) in the 1960s and 1970s. These were followed, in turn, by 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, China and Vietnam. In all these cases, it was found that the state 
had violated the main tenets of the WC, not least through protectionism, directed finance, and 
other major departures from the free market. The second criticism of the WC focused upon 
adjustment with a human face. Irrespective of the questionable merits of the WC in bringing 
stability and growth, the adverse impact of WC policies on those in, or on the borders of, poverty 
was highlighted. The WC stood accused of being at least oblivious to the issue of who bore the 
burden of adjustment and stabilisation. It was also criticised for tolerating, and even promoting, 
rising inequality as a way of reducing the fiscal burden on the state and of enhancing the scope 
for introduction of market incentives in everything from health and education to agriculture and 
to the workings of urban labour markets (see Chang, 2003 and Chang and Grabel, 2004). 
The mounting opposition to the WC on these fronts dovetailed with the growing evidence of the 
1980s as a “lost decade” for development across the portfolio of policies and countries that were 
subject to adjustment through conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and the IMF. As a 
result, the World Bank in particular sought to defend itself through questionable appeals to the 
empirical evidence, selective reference to the occasional if invariably temporary (and always 
carefully promoted) star performers, and the argument that the problem was not with the policies 
but with lack of their implementation (opening the way to subsequent 
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discourses around corruption, good governance, and the like). This effort culminated in the 
publication of a major report on the East Asian NICs (World Bank, 1993), arguing that 
government intervention had been extensive but had only succeeded because it had been along 
the lines of what the market would have done had it been working perfectly – and, in any case, 
the East Asian experience was not replicable in other countries. 
These attempts to defend the WC soon proved to be futile, and the PWC was launched from 
within the World Bank in the second half of the 1990s. In terms of scholarship, both in intrinsic 
quality and external recognition, the PWC has been far more powerful than its predecessor, with 
its pioneer, Joseph Stiglitz, receiving the Nobel Prize for economics in 2001 having just been 
removed from his position as Chief Economist at the World Bank for reasons that will become 
apparent below. Substantively, the intellectual thrust of the PWC has been to emphasise the 
significance of market and institutional imperfections, as opposed to the virtues of the (perfect) 
market promoted by the WC. Consequently, the PWC rejects the WC for its antipathy to state 
intervention, and it also questions the conventional macroeconomic stabilisation policies for their 
severely adverse short- and long-term impacts. Policy-wise, the rhetoric of the PWC was 
comparatively state-friendly but in a limited and piecemeal way, with intervention only justified 
on a case-by-case basis, should it be demonstrable that narrow economic benefits would most 
likely accrue. Despite its obvious limitations, the PWC provided a rationale for discretionary 
intervention across a much wider range of economic and social policy than the WC. However, it 
remained fundamentally pro-market, favouring a poorly examined deepening of the process of 
“globalisation” but, presumably, with a human face and guiding hand. 
Rhetorically, the PWC tended to exaggerate the contrast with the traditional WC concerns (van 
Waeyenberge, 2007), allowing Stiglitz stridently to protest policies imposed by the IMF on 
Russia and South Korea, in particular, which triggered his enforced departure from office at the 
World Bank. Significantly, like the WC, the PWC also has no notion of development beyond 
growth and efficiency, as opposed to an exaggerated emphasis on the means of achieving it. The 
PWC focuses on the correction of market and institutional imperfections on a piecemeal basis, 
rather than simply relying upon the market as for the WC, but also presuming that the “correct” 
institutional and policy framework is sufficient to secure long- term economic success, 
understood as a higher growth rate. Further, policy in practice under the PWC has, if anything 
and despite flagship Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, promoted by the World Bank and the 
IMF as part of their external debt relief initiative, tightened on the traditional measures 
associated with the WC conditionalities in the application of criteria for assessing eligibility for 
aid or debt forgiveness (van Waeyenberge, 2007). The one exception, apparently, is in 
liberalising the controls on international capital flows, but this is explained by the extent to 
which this had already been achieved, and is no longer necessary as an imposed policy. 
The emergence of the PWC is best seen as deriving from economic orthodoxy or, at least, from 
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trends within it. The market imperfection economics on which it is based, especially the appeal 
to the notion that individual agents are imperfectly coordinated by the market alone, did not 
evolve in the context of development, but was applied to it after the event, at an opportune 
moment. This was as replacement for the discredited WC view that had pioneered the new in 
place of the old development economics in the context of the rise of neoliberalism, monetarism 
and supply-side economics, and which also emerged without a thought for development, as was 
shown above. Further, the PWC itself is indicative of a more general and aggressive phase of 
economic imperialism, in which the economic and the social are perceived to be reducible to 
market imperfections and the institutional responses to them (Fine 2009b). Everything from 
corruption through to civil war and aid-effectiveness is to be explained by reference to 
imperfectly coordinated pursuit of self-interest, defined by reference either to narrow economic 
motives or to arbitrary addition of other motives and factors (such as degree of linguistic 
diversity, tropical climate, and so on). 
Thus, despite what appears to be a radical shift from the WC to the PWC, upon closer analysis 
the PWC only represents a limited break from it. This can be highlighted in two ways. First, 
despite its rejection in principle of the neoliberal free market ideology and one- model-fits-all 
WC policies, the PWC remains wholly committed to mainstream economics. This is strikingly 
brought out by one of the leading proponents of the new (market imperfections) development 
economics. In his book, appropriately entitled One Economics, Many Recipes, Dani Rodrik 
(2007, p.3) pronounces: 
This book is strictly grounded in neoclassical economic analysis. At the core of neoclassical 
economics lies the following methodological predisposition: social phenomena can best be 
understood by considering them to be an aggregation of purposeful behaviour by individuals – in 
their roles as consumer, producer, investor, politician, and so on – interacting with each other 
and acting under the constraints that their environment imposes. This I find to be not just a 
powerful discipline for organizing our thoughts on economic affairs, but the only sensible way of 
thinking about them. If I often depart from the consensus that “mainstream” economists have 
reached in matters of development policy, this has less to do with different modes of analysis 
than with different readings of the evidence and with different evaluations of the “political 
economy” of developing nations ... [T]he tendency of many economists to offer advice based on 
simple rules of thumb regardless of context (privatize this, liberalize that), is a derogation rather 
than a proper application of neoclassical economic principles. 
Second, although the developmental state literature played a major role in discrediting the WC 
since the 1980s, the PWC has proceeded as if this concept, and its more systemic approach to 
development, does not exist. In part, this reflects the peculiar relationship between mainstream 
(WC or PWC) development economics and development studies. The latter has always been at 
least multidisciplinary if not interdisciplinary, was borne out of support for decolonisation and 
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antipathy to modernisation as a unifying framework for addressing (under)development. 
Significantly, the discipline was housed in newly formed dedicated departments in the UK and 
several Western European countries, but in non- economics disciplinary departments in the 
United States. While these arrangements have allowed its radicalism to persist, it was gradually 
outflanked as well as encroached upon by the rise of the new development economics within and 
around economics departments, and the increasing influence of the Washington institutions over 
the entire development agenda since the early 1980s (Fine, 2009b). 
Neoliberalism, Politics and Development 
Such considerations are crucial in broaching the politics of the WC and its critics. The IMF and, 
later, the WC, were notoriously equivocal in their commitment to political democracy. Their 
casual attachment to political liberalism was driven by an overwhelming commitment to the 
geopolitical interests of the United States and, later, to the shock therapy associated with the first 
stage of the neoliberal reforms. If these reforms could be imposed only by an undemocratic state, 
as was the case in Chile and elsewhere (see above), the Washington institutions would turn a 
blind eye to human rights and other abuses. 
However, as the 1980s progressed the simultaneous spread of democracy and neoliberalism 
demonstrated that political openness was not inimical to economic “responsibility”. Further 
evidence supported an even stronger case for democracy within neoliberalism. Mainstream 
academics and the Washington institutions gradually realised that democratic regimes can more 
reliably deliver the jurisdictional certainty required for the smooth functioning of the (financial) 
markets than most dictatorships. This is largely because of the constitutional attachment of the 
democratic regimes to due process and the rule of law (see, for example, Gill, 2002). When 
neoliberalism achieved worldwide hegemony, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion 
of the international left, and in the light of the controlled transitions to democracy in Latin 
America and South Africa, the dangers of “rogue” (undependable) dictatorships trumped the 
Western fears of political openness in the South. These fears were, traditionally, grounded on the 
supposed propensity of democratic regimes in poor countries to accommodate populist electoral 
majorities and their inability to contain leftist agitation. These concerns remained in the 
background, but they were tempered by the realisation that, once the neoliberal reforms had been 
introduced, it would be harder to reverse them in a democracy to the extent that the logic of 
financial and financialised policy discipline imposed its apparently sacrosanct logic upon the 
constitutional process and the institutional fabric of the country (see below). The crisis starting in 
2007 has exploded the associated myth of TINA (there is no alternative) not least as, in the midst 
of economic crisis, developed countries with the USA in the lead, have dedicated vast resources 
to shore up a dysfunctional financial system having previously denied such resources and 
corresponding interventionist policies to their own populations and to developing countries for 
health, education, welfare and aid in far more favourable circumstances. In fact, Oxfam has 
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estimated that the financial rescue packages would suffice to eliminate world poverty for the next 
fifty years.2 
Retrospectively, it is clear that the WC had stumbled, casually, upon the best of all possible 
worlds. The neoliberal reforms transferred to the financial markets the responsibility for 
allocating social resources, while political democracy supported these reforms through the 
institutionalisation of a legitimate state which was, simultaneously, permanently hamstrung by 
some combination of insufficient administrative capacity (after the “roll-back” of the state 
through the neoliberal reforms), fractious multiparty legislatures and bitterly competing sectional 
interests, which inevitably flourish in a democracy. In these fragmented and structurally 
weakened states, the balance of power is preserved by an “independent” judiciary that locks in 
the neoliberal reforms under the guise of the “rule of law”, an independent central bank, or 
conditionalities imposed in return for aid.3 
In contrast, the PWC has always been more sensitive to the non-economic domain than its 
heavily blinkered predecessor, and it proved to be better adapted to the new circumstances. In the 
1990s and 2000s, Stiglitz and his associates rationalised the emerging synthesis between 
2 Oxfam press release, 1 April 2009, 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/applications/blogs/pressoffice/?p=4078 (accessed 13 July 2009). 3 
Typically, the limited achievements of the Lula administration in Brazil, despite the high 
expectations elicited by his presidential election, were mirrored by similar lame improvements in 
social policies and economic outcomes in most countries caught in the ‘pink tide’ across Latin 
America (Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay). Only in those countries where 
the Constitution was rewritten (Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela) were more significant 
achievements possible. See, for example, ECLAC (2008). 
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political democracy and neoliberal economic policies under the guise of institution-building and 
the imperative to limit corruption (which is, presumably, better achieved in a democracy), in 
order to support long-term economic growth. The emerging commitment of the Washington 
institutions with political democracy was supported by the expanded conditionality promoted by 
the World Bank, which included not only the narrow menu of policy reforms identified by John 
Williamson as the Washington Consensus,4 but also a whole raft of, at times, less tangible 
reforms aiming to consolidate “good governance”.5 
These mutually reinforcing reasons to promote democracy in the South were enthusiastically 
supported by the development industry which preyed upon, and thrived in and around, the 
aid-dependent countries. The Washington institutions could finally establish a constructive 
dialogue with the aid agencies and NGOs which, in the not-too-distant past, had criticised 
heavily the human cost of the WC policies (see, for example, Bracking, 2009 and Green, 2008). 
Conclusion 
The accretion of conditionalities and policy reforms by the PWC reveals its attachment to the 
same conception of development previously espoused by the Washington Consensus. That is, 
development as the natural (financial market-led) outcome of a set of more or less narrow, and 
sometimes shifting but unambiguously “correct” policies imposed from above, and under 
external guidance. Paradoxically, this has been compatible with a significant increase in the 
degree of legitimacy of the policies associated with the Washington institutions, as they have 
been embraced, within limits, by some of its erstwhile critics. 
This emerging accommodation suffered a grievous blow with the onset of the 2007 financial 
crisis. As the crisis unfolds, and the mainstream seeks shelter under heavy state intervention 
while, simultaneously, seeking to blame poor financial sector regulation for the debacle, the 
rationale for untrammelled liberalisation has lost its residual credibility. It is unlikely to 
disappear completely while capitalism remains, but it may become marginalised for a relatively 
long period of time. In contrast, the PWC, with its boundless capacity to incorporate policy 
novelties and refinements while remaining faithful to the tenets of the mainstream, is likely to 
prosper and to become the hegemonic player in the development field, including the Washington 
institutions, academia, and many aid agencies. 
These included fiscal discipline; redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields 
offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as 
primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure; tax reform (to lower marginal rates 
and broaden the tax base); interest rate liberalization; competitive exchange rates; trade 
liberalisation; liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment; privatisation; deregulation 
(to abolish barriers to entry and exit), and secure property rights. 
The augmented WC includes improvements to corporate governance; anti-corruption; flexible 
labor markets; WTO agreements; financial codes and standards; “prudent” capital- account 
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opening; non-intermediate exchange rate regimes; independent central banks/inflation targeting; 
social safety nets, and targeted poverty reduction. 
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Although the PWC can more readily accommodate different institutional arrangements, state 
intervention and pro-poor policies, which is commendable from the point of view of the critics of 
the WC, the greater plasticity of the PWC could make it extremely difficult to dislodge, although 
this is not impossible. The need and prospects for alternative development strategies, and for 
heterodox understandings of the development process, to supplement and support the social 
movements challenging neoliberalism and regressive economic policies, remain as urgent as they 
are uncertain in scope, content and appeal. 
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